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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes significant
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to identify cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other noteworthy cases. As
a special project, Associate Editors assist in researching and writing the
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Brainard and Sean Marrin, for their hard work in writing the North Dakota Supreme Court
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT – RETAINING FEE – CLIENT’S FUNDS
OR PROPERTY
Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court v. Hoffman (In re Hoffman)
In a per curiam opinion, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded
that an attorney violated the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct
when failing to refund fees that had been paid under a non-refundable,
minimum fee agreement to a client who had terminated services before the
conclusion of the matter.2 The facts are that Hoffman accepted employment
in a criminal matter.3 In the contract for legal services, Hoffman agreed to
“defend the charges to dismissal, sentence or deferred imposition of
sentence, including a jury trial. . . .”4 The agreement included a nonrefundable minimum fee of $30,000, which was paid and placed in the
attorney’s operating account.5 Hoffman prepared for and appeared at a
preliminary hearing; ultimately spending 25.8 hours on the case and turning
down other clients.6 Only one day after the preliminary hearing, the
accused terminated Hoffman’s services and requested return of the
unearned funds.7 Hoffman refused, and the Disciplinary Board petitioned
for discipline, alleging violations under the North Dakota Rules of
Professional Conduct.8 A hearing panel heard the case and recommended
reprimand, return of unearned funds, and payment of the costs of the
disciplinary hearing.9 Hoffman objected.10
Upon review, the court determined that Hoffman did not violate North
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a).11 Using a totality of the
circumstances analysis, it was observed the case involved serious, multiple
felony charges, was taken over from another attorney, and Hoffman had
voiced concerns the client was only changing attorneys to obtain a
continuance of the preliminary hearing.12 Furthermore, the attorney noted
the client presented a difficult case and he would need to be compensated

2. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court v. Hoffman, 2013 ND 137, ¶ 28, 834 N.W.2d 636.
3. Id. ¶ 2.
4. Id. ¶ 7.
5. Id. ¶ 2.
6. Id. ¶ 35.
7. Id. ¶ 3.
8. Id. ¶ 4. The Disciplinary Counsel alleged violation of N.D. R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.5(a),
Fees; N.D. R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.15(a) and (c), Safekeeping Property; and N.D. R. PROF.
CONDUCT R. 1.16(e), Declining or Terminating Representation. Id.
9. Id. ¶ 8.
10. Id. ¶ 4.
11. Id. ¶ 19.
12. Id. ¶ 18.
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for his availability.13 Finally, the court noted that both Hoffman and his
expert testified the fee was reasonable in North Dakota; the expert even
acknowledged it was “perhaps a little low.”14 Accordingly, the fee was
found to be reasonable.15
The court also determined that Hoffman did not violate North Dakota
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.15 by depositing the minimum fee in
his operating account.16 The court acknowledged the terms of the contract
specified the $30,000 was intended to be a non-refundable, minimum fee;
thus, the fee became Hoffman’s property on payment, and the fee would not
be held in a trust account.17 Therefore, it was proper to deposit the fee in an
operating account.18
The court then turned to the issue of the return of disputed funds under
North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(e).19 The court
stated the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct are based on the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and thus it may look to other
authorities who have interpreted a particular rule under the Model Rules.20
The court acknowledged that while Rule 1.16 jurisprudence requires
lawyers must return any unearned advance payments when the
contemplated work was not completed, the decisions have not squarely
addressed an attorney’s obligations where the fee was labelled “nonrefundable,” and the client, not the attorney, breached the contract for legal
services.21 Other courts, however, have determined that “regardless of how
fees are designated by an agreement . . . [an attorney] may still have a duty
to refund fees which have been considered property of the attorney and not
held in trust.” 22 Furthermore, other jurisdictions have required the total fee
be subject to a reasonableness standard.23 The court specifically noted that
even if the fee is reasonable at the time the agreement was reached, later
events may cause the fee agreement to become unreasonable at the time of
enforcement.24 Accordingly, the client may be entitled to a return of some

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id.
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portion of the non-refundable fee retainer under the circumstances, subject
to the reasonableness of the fee.25
The court further underscored that a client may discharge the attorney
at any time for any reason.26 In the case of termination, the lawyer is not
entitled to the full amount contracted for, but should only be compensated
for the legal services actually performed.27 Even though the attorney and
client have clearly agreed to a non-refundable, minimum fee; upon
termination, the lawyer is required to return that portion of the fees
collected, but not yet earned, such that the total fee collected for the legal
services provided is not unreasonable.28
The court concluded that Hoffman committed the alleged violation in
failing to return funds after the termination of services when all of the
services under the contract had not been performed to completion.29 The
court ordered return of the funds not yet earned.30 However, the court
refused to impose discipline proposed by the Disciplinary Board, citing that
there was no clear prior decision on the issue of whether an attorney may be
required to return a non-refundable fee when a client terminated the
lawyer’s services.31 Furthermore, the court cited to the facts that no
evidence was presented that Hoffman violated the contract, that the client
had previously terminated another attorney’s representation, and evidence
was presented that minimum fee agreements are common in North Dakota
among the criminal defense bar.32 Finally, the court exercised its discretion
to alter the assessment of costs and fees against Hoffman.33 Thus, the court
reduced the assessment of the Disciplinary Board by approximately twothirds, representing the fact that Hoffman only committed one of three
alleged violations.34
While Hoffman was not accused of failure to safe keep property, the
court provided guidance on this issue.35 Once the attorney has notice that
the funds are in dispute, even in a minimum fee agreement, the attorney is
required to segregate those funds into a trust account under the rule

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id.
Id. ¶ 27.
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requiring safekeeping of client property until the dispute is resolved.36 The
court acknowledged this could become an issue in a minimum fee
agreement, as the attorney may not have sufficient funds to place into a trust
account.37

36. Id.
37. Id.
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AUTOMOBILES – ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES – DRIVING
UNDER THE INFLUENCE
Morrow v. Ziegler
In Morrow v. Ziegler38 Charles Morrow sought review of a district
court judgment affirming a hearing officer’s decision suspending his license
to drive for one year. After his privileges were revoked for refusal to
submit to an SD-5 test during the course of a DUI investigation, Morrow
requested an administrative hearing on the suspension of his driving
privileges, arguing section 39-20-04 requires an officer to include on a
report and notice that an individual’s body contained alcohol.39 The North
Dakota Department of Transportation’s (“Department”) hearing officer held
when the police officer checked the section of the report and notice by
“[r]efused onsite screening test,” the officer indicated the elements under
section 39-20-14 were met and Morrow’s one-year suspension was
proper.40 On appeal, Morrow argued an officer must specifically indicate a
belief that a driver’s body contained alcohol on the report and notice
document.41 The Department maintained the officer’s opinion serves as a
pre-requisite to a request for onsite screening and therefore checking the
“[r]efused onsite screening test” implies the officer’s opinion as to the
suspect’s intoxication.42 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed.43
Charles Morrow was stopped for speeding by Highway Patrol Officer
Shawn Skogen.44 During the investigation, Officer Skogen observed
Morrow had blood shot eyes and smelled of alcohol.45 Morrow admitted to
consuming one beer with dinner and Officer Skogen conducted a standard
battery of field sobriety tests to determine Morrow’s level of intoxication.46
Morrow was read the implied consent advisory and asked to submit to the
SD-5 screening but refused.47 Thereafter, Officer Skogen concluded he did
not believe Morrow was sufficiently intoxicated to be arrested for driving
under the influence and released him.48 On the report and notice however,
Officer Skogen checked the box indicating Morrow had refused the onsite
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

2013 ND 28, 826 N.W.2d 912.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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test and the nature of the traffic violation supporting the stop, but wrote
“N/A” in the probable cause section.49 This action initiated Morrow’s
license suspension principally in dispute.50
For its analysis, the court focused on its decision in Aamodt v. N.D.
Department of Transportation,51 to determine whether the provision in
question was basic and mandatory. In Aamodt, when an officer failed to
provide adequate probable cause that an individual was in actual physical
control of a vehicle while under the influence, it was a material requirement
to the subsequent suspension and predicated the Department’s action.52
Without probable cause, the court noted, the Department had insufficient
information to suspend driving privileges.53 A central takeaway is that an
officer must similarly form an opinion that an individual’s body contains
alcohol before the implied consent provision will apply.54
Morrow’s contention was not that the form was insufficient, but that
Officer Skogen could have recorded his observations or his belief of
Morrow’s intoxication on the form but failed to do so.55 The current report
and notice form provided space to mark Officer Skogen’s findings and this
would have given the Department sufficient information to reasonably infer
Morrow’s body contained alcohol.56 The Department argued the officer’s
opinion was essentially a “predicate to requesting an onsite screening test”
and the opinion of Morrow’s intoxication was implied in fact by virtue of
the test being requested in the first place.57
The court disagreed, noting such an inference runs contrary to
legislative intent and “slants the law too much toward the Department’s
convenience.”58 The report and notice, when used to suspend an
individual’s driving privileges, must communicate in some sufficiently
direct or indirect way that an officer believed the individual’s body
contained alcohol.59 Even though Officer Skogen did not find sufficient
probable cause to arrest, he still could have accurately logged his
observations and the Department would have had legitimate grounds to

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 8.
2004 ND 134, ¶ 15, 682 N.W.2d 308.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 9.
Morrow, 2013 ND 28 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-14)).
Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
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revoke the license.60 The absence of such observational information,
however, made the report, not the form itself, deficient and did not provide
the Department with sufficient authority to act.61
Justices Sandstrom and Maring concurred with Chief Justice
VandeWalle’s majority opinion.62 Justice Kapsner concurred in the result,
but filed a separate opinion to which Justice Crothers concurred.63 Justice
Kapsner’s concurrence found the officer’s form plainly provided no
authority and, in fact, was not deficient as the majority suggested.64 The
officer’s response to the probable cause prompt, “N/A,” and submission of
the form to the Department was clear indication the officer had no opinion
as to whether Morrow’s body contained alcohol, and thus, the Department
had no authority to act.65

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶¶ 15-20.
Id.
Id.
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CRIMINAL LAW – CONSPIRACY – HOMICIDE – CRIMINAL
INTENT
State v. Borner
In State v. Borner,66 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
charge of conspiracy to commit murder is not a cognizable offense.67 Over
vigorous dissent, the court recognized that conspiracy is a specific intent
crime that requires both intent to agree and the intent to achieve a particular
result that is criminal.68 Thus, conspiracy to commit murder requires a
finding of intent to cause death and cannot be based on a theory of murder
under extreme indifference murder.69
Borner was charged with criminal conspiracy to commit murder under
both criminal conspiracy and extreme indifference murder statutes.70 At a
pretrial hearing, the State amended the criminal information to specify the
culpability requirement for extreme indifference murder includes
“knowingly” rather than “willfully.”71 At trial, there was debate over the
definition of conspiracy to commit murder in the jury instructions.72 The
court included that conspiracy to commit murder requires an agreement to
cause murder or cause death.73 However, the State argued the agreement
was to create a circumstance, manifested by an extreme indifference to the
value of human life, and an agreement to commit murder was not an
essential element of the charge.74 Borner agreed with the court, arguing an
agreement to create circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
constituted conspiracy to commit reckless endangerment.75
After the State’s case, Borner’s co-conspirator sought a judgment of
acquittal, arguing a failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
defendant’s agreed to commit murder.76 The motion was denied, and
66. 2013 ND 141, 863 N.W.2d 383.
67. Id. ¶ 1.
68. Id.
69. Id. ¶ 24.
70. Id. ¶ 2. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06-04, 12.1-16-01(1)(b). Id.
71. Id. The amended complaint in Count One stated, “That the Defendants did then and
there agree with one another to knowingly engage in or cause circumstances manifesting extreme
difference to the value of life.” Id. ¶ 3.
72. Id. ¶ 4.
73. Id. ¶ 5.
74. Id.
75. Id. The final jury instructions defined conspiracy to commit murder as follows: “A
person is guilty of conspiracy to commit murder if the person agreed with another to knowingly
engage in or cause conduct which, in fact, constitutes the offense of murder of another under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, and one party to that
agreement did an overt act to effect an objective of the conspiracy.” Id.
76. Id. ¶ 6.
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Borner was found guilty of two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. 77
Upon conviction, Borner appealed the trial court’s conviction for
conspiracy to commit murder, arguing the amended criminal information
failed to charge him with an offense, the jury instructions did not correct the
information’s defect, and evidence presented was insufficient to support a
finding that defendants knowingly agreed to willfully cause the death of any
person.78
Conspiracy is a specific intent crime.79 The Court observed that
conspiracy is really composed of two “intents;” the first is the intent to
agree, and the second is the intent to achieve the criminal result.80 Upon
review of the North Dakota statute, the Court perceived that the conspiracy
statute requires proof the accused agreed to engage in or cause conduct, the
agreed upon conduct constitutes a criminal offense, and a party to the
agreement has performed an overt act to effectuate on objective of the
conspiracy.81 The court further noted many jurisdictions also require the
specific intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed for
conspiracy to exist.82
Borner was charged with agreeing to engage in conduct causing
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human
life.83 The State argued that by so agreeing, Borner agreed to engage in
conduct which constitutes the offense of murder.84 The court disagreed,
citing the requisite intent for conspiracy under the Model Penal Code as
follows:
In relation to those elements of substantive crimes that consist of
proscribed conduct or undesirable results of conduct, the Code
requires purposeful behavior for guilt, regardless of the state of
mind required by the definition of the substantive crime. . . . If
[the crime] is defined in terms of a result of conduct, such as
homicide, his purpose must be to promote or facilitate the
production of that result. Thus, it would not be sufficient as it is
under the attempt provision of the Code, if the actor only believed

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
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the result would be produced but did not consciously plan or desire
to produce it.85
The court further cited another source which states, “there is no such
thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of
recklessly or negligently causing a result.”86 The court noted extreme
indifference murder is a general intent crime in which the accused does not
intend to cause death, rather death is a result of the accused’s willful
conduct.87 Thus, “when recklessness or negligence suffices for the actor’s
culpability with respect to a result element of a substantive crime . . . there
could not be a conspiracy to commit that crime.”88
Accordingly, the court noted, charging the specific intent crime of
murder requires the accused had the intent to cause the death of another
person.89 Charging the defendant with conspiracy to commit extreme
indifference murder, a general intent crime, is inconsistent with the
elements of conspiracy.90 The court discerned an individual cannot intend
to achieve a particular offense that by its definition is unintended; one
cannot agree in advance to accomplish an unintended result.91
In North Dakota, conspiracy to commit extreme indifference murder is
not a cognizable offense.92 To find a defendant guilty of conspiracy to
commit murder, the State must show an intent to agree, an intent to cause
death, and an overt act.93 The criminal judgment for conspiracy to commit
murder was reversed.94
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred in the result obtained by the
majority, but observed the majority’s analysis was hyper technical.95
Rather, the Chief Justice observed, the conspiracy and murder statutes,
when read together are ambiguous. As a result, they are to be construed
against the government.96
Justice Sandstrom dissented vigorously, citing failure of Borner to
object at trial and inability of the Defendant to establish plain error on

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. ¶ 15. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 5.03).
Id. ¶ 15 (quoting SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 12.2(c)(2)).
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 5.03).
Id. ¶ 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 29.
Id.
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appeal.97 Additionally, the dissenting opinion rebutted most of the
contentions held by the majority, citing United States Supreme Court and
other persuasive authority’s rulings on conspiracy, which require only proof
of the criminal intent required by the substantive offense itself.98 These
cases supported the State’s view of the charge, that is, it is the conduct that
must be intended, as opposed to the result.99 The dissent also noted the
North Dakota laws are modeled on federal law, and not the Model Penal
Code, which diverge on this issue.100 Thus, it was incorrect to rely on the
Model Penal Code in analyzing this issue under North Dakota law.101

97. Id. ¶ 31.
98. Id. ¶ 37.
99. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 56.
101. Id. ¶ 69.
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CRIMINAL LAW – DOUBLE JEOPARDY – JUVENILE
PROCEEDINGS
In re M.H.P.
In re M.H.P.,102 was a case in which the State of North Dakota sought
reversal of a juvenile court order dismissing the State’s delinquency petition
against a minor, M.H.P. In a case of first impression, the North Dakota
Supreme Court upheld the juvenile court’s findings and dismissal.103 The
Court based its ruling by applying the double jeopardy clause under the
Fifth Amendment.104
In 2012, fifteen-year-old male, M.H.P., was alleged by the State to
have committed felony gross sexual imposition (“GSI”) against E.B., a
minor, by touching her vaginal area through her clothes.105 At the initial
hearing, a juvenile referee determined M.H.P. had indeed engaged in sexual
contact with E.B., and scheduled a dispositional hearing.106 At the later
held hearing however, the referee ruled M.H.P.’s treatment or rehabilitation
as a delinquent child, required for a statutory finding of delinquency, did
not need to be decided.107 While the referee previously found beyond a
reasonable doubt that M.H.P. had committed the delinquent act, he clarified
his new position: “[a]lthough this fact alone [commission of the alleged GSI
act] would be sufficient to sustain a finding of a need for treatment and
rehabilitation, there was a substantial amount of evidence to the
contrary.”108 Thereafter, the State’s petition was dismissed and the juvenile
court determined M.H.P.’s question as to registration as a sexual offender
need not be decided.109
On appeal, the State argued the juvenile court erred in holding
treatment or rehabilitation of M.H.P. was not needed, the juvenile court
erred in dismissing the State’s petition and in failing to address whether
M.H.P.’s registration as a sexual offender.110 M.H.P. maintained the State’s
appeal was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment
because of the juvenile court’s finding of insufficient evidence.111 On a
matter of first impression, the court sought to resolve the issue of whether a
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

2013 ND 61, 830 N.W.2d 216.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 5.
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juvenile dispositional hearings’ finding is appealable or whether it is barred
by double jeopardy.112 The court referenced and distinguished its decision
in In re B.F.,113 where the State was precluded from appealing a juvenile
court’s order of acquittal of a juvenile and rejection of a judicial referee’s
finding of guilt.114 Applying a similar analysis, the court first examined the
underlying delinquency posture in M.H.P.’s case.115
Under section 27-20-02(7), North Dakota defines a delinquent child as
“a child who has committed a delinquent act and is in need of treatment or
rehabilitation.”116 To meet the statutory definition, the juvenile must be
found to have (a) committed a delinquent act and (b) found to be in need of
treatment or rehabilitation.117 While M.H.P. was found by the juvenile
court at the initial petition hearing to have committed a delinquent act, the
determination of treatment or rehabilitation was reserved for a second
dispositional hearing.118 Evidence presented at the dispositional hearing on
M.H.P.’s behalf, however, gave rise to the referee’s conclusion that
treatment or rehabilitation was not needed.119
Because the State was essentially asking the court to reverse a factual
finding by the juvenile court and order M.H.P. be deemed delinquent, the
court concluded this was impermissible.120 To make such a finding would
place M.H.P. at risk of loss of liberty, the very concern the Double Jeopardy
Clause seeks to prevent.121 Double jeopardy, the court noted, is meant to
require that an individual only be subject to the experience of threatened
liberty once for the same crime.122 And while in the juvenile action, M.H.P.
is not at risk for per se criminal punishment, the Double Jeopardy Clause
still applies in equal force to juvenile delinquency proceedings and
precludes the court from overturning the juvenile court’s findings.123
In response to the State’s second argument that the judicial referee
erred by dismissing the petition and not requiring M.H.P. to register as a
sexual offender, the court recognized that double jeopardy does not bar an
appellate review of the issue of registration because it does not concern

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
2009 ND 53, 764 N.W.2d 170.
In re M.H.P., 2013 ND 61, ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 8.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(7).
In re M.H.P., 2013 ND 61, ¶ 9.
Id
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 13
Id.
Id.
Id.
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prosecution or re-prosecution of a criminal offense.124 Nevertheless, the
dismissal was found valid.125 The State argued the judicial referee only
dismissed the “proceeding” (the dispositional hearing) and therefore the
referee could still have made a determination as to whether M.H.P. was
required to register as a sexual offender.126 Citing subsections (1) and (2)
of 27-20-29, the State focused on the usage of “petition” and “proceeding”
in the statute.127 The wording of subsection (1) directs the court to “dismiss
the petition” in the event the court finds delinquency has not been met.128
Similarly, subsection (2) directs the court to “dismiss the proceeding” if the
juvenile is found not to be in need of treatment or rehabilitation.129 On
these grounds, the State alleged even if the proceeding was dismissed, the
referee could still have made a determination on the issue as to M.H.P.’s
registration as a sexual offender.130 The court disagreed, noting the juvenile
court must find the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation before
other procedural dispositions may be pursued and, absent such a finding,
the case must be dismissed.131 The State’s appeal of the findings was
dismissed for violating the Double Jeopardy Clause and the juvenile order
dismissing the State’s petition was affirmed.132

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. ¶¶ 16, 17.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19 (citing MODEL JUVENILE COURT ACT (U.L.A.) § 29 cmt.).
Id. ¶ 22.
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CRIMINAL LAW – INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION – INFANTS
State v. Stegall
In State v. Stegall,133 the State appealed a consolidated dismissal of
three separate criminal complaints of endangerment of a child. The North
Dakota Supreme Court upheld the district court dismissals. The Court held
the state child endangerment statute did not apply to acts by a mother
against an unborn child, and the fugitive dismissal rule did not apply to a
defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss.134
Defendants Alexis Stegall, Chelsea Hettich, and Kimberlie Lamon
(“Defendants”) were all separately charged with endangerment of a child
under section 19-03.1-22.2 of North Dakota’s Criminal Code after all three
Defendants gave birth to children testing positive for methamphetamine.135
After giving birth to her child in December of 2011 and later charged,
Stegall became a fugitive after missing important motion deadlines and
court dates.136 Stegall was apprehended in July of 2012 and her second
court-appointed attorney moved to dismiss, arguing the child endangerment
statute does not apply to prenatal ingestion of controlled substances.137
Despite Stegall’s earlier truancy, the trial court reviewed her motion and
dismissed the State’s complaint, finding no evidence to support post-natal
allegations of exposure.138
Hettich was charged in April of 2012 with two counts of endangerment
of a child after giving birth to twins, whom later tested positive for
methamphetamine.139 Subsequent tests revealed one child presented with
methamphetamine and one did not.140 Testimony from investigators heard
by the trial court, however, indicated neither Hettich nor the new born
twins, were exposed to methamphetamine after birth.141 Finding the State’s
allegations insufficient, the trial court granted Hettich’s motion to
dismiss.142
Defendant Lamon was charged with one count of endangerment of a
child in July of 2012 after testing positive for methamphetamine

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

2013 ND 49, 828 N.W.2d 526.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶¶ 1, 2.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 3, 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
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immediately following her child’s birth.143 Lamon similarly moved for a
dismissal, arguing the State’s information and complaint failed to allege
commission of an act against her child.144 The trial court concluded no
allegations demonstrating methamphetamine exposure took place after the
child’s birth and therefore the complaint was insufficient.145 Lamon’s case
was similarly dismissed.146
While the court addressed the implications of the fugitive dismissal
rule in Stegall’s case, finding it within the district court’s discretion to
extend motion deadlines, the principal issue in all three appeals was
whether section 19-03.1-22.2 may be used to prosecute all three pregnant
women for ingesting a controlled substance during pregnancy based on
detrimental postpartum effects on the children.147 Defendants maintained
the statute did not apply to unborn children.148 The State argued the
prenatal ingestion of controlled substances continued to impact the health
and welfare of the child, and therefore the child is still “exposed” to the
substance even though no postpartum ingestion exists.149 The North Dakota
Supreme Court disagreed with the State’s position.
Citing its decision in State v. Geiser,150 the court focused its analysis
on the definition of the terms “minor” and “child.”151 Section 14-10-01, as
interpreted in Geiser, plainly establishes a “child” is a “minor” and is
acknowledged as such from the first minute of the day the person is born.152
However, section 19-03.1-22.2 does not apply to an unborn child, nor did
the court find any legislative intent showing the provision would pertain to
unborn children.153 Since the Legislature defined unborn child in section
12.1-17.1, the court noted the Legislature was capable of incorporating the
definition into other statutes, but did not do so for the purposes of the child
endangerment law.154 In its opinion, the court recognized rights of unborn
children to be shielded from third party actors by virtue of statutes
criminalizing, among several acts, aggravated assault, murder, or assault
against an unborn child.155 This evidenced the legislative intent to
143.
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150.
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Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 14.
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Id. ¶ 14.
2009 ND 36, 763 N.W.2d 469.
Stegall, 2013 ND 49, ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 16 (citing Geiser interpretation of N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-01).
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 16, 17.
Id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added).
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expressly protect unborn children, which is not similarly present under the
endangerment of a child statute.156
The State argued the Geiser holding was not applicable since the
unborn child in Geiser died in utero.157 The court responded by noting the
decision in Geiser, where a mother was charged for endangerment of a
child after overdosing on prescription drugs which contributed to the
demise of her unborn child in utero, was not a determinative fact in that
case.158 Rather, the Geiser decision is in line with a majority of states
holding a viable fetus is not a child and pregnant women cannot be
prosecuted for ingestion of controlled substances during pregnancy.159 For
the Defendants’ case, the court held section 19-03.1-22.2 does not apply to
acts committed upon an unborn child irrespective of whether the child is
born alive or perishes in utero.160 A pregnant woman is not criminally
liable for endangerment of a child resulting from prenatal conduct, even if
the child is born harmed.161 Holding otherwise, the court concluded, would
result in the criminalization of an act that is not criminal at the time of the
act, if the child dies in utero, but only it affects the child who is born.162
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CRIMINAL LAW – SEARCHES AND SEIZURES – EVIDENCE
WRONGLY OBTAINED
State v. Nickel
In State v. Nickel,163 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
removal of a package suspected to contain illicit material from a shipping
center to the police station and subsequently to the state crime lab was in
contravention of the Fourth Amendment, and evidence stemming from such
warrantless seizure should be suppressed.164 Nickel and another codefendant owned Big Willies ATP, a smoke shop. Nickel’s sister delivered
a package to We Ship, Etc. (“We Ship”), a United Parcel Services outlet,
for delivery to a company in California.165 The owner asked the sister
about the package’s contents, and observed that while she appeared nervous
and evasive, she eventually replied that she was returning merchandise.166
The owner had previously refused to ship packages for Big Willies over
concerns for legality of the items shipped, and he felt suspicious about the
contents of this package, as well.167
Pursuant to We Ship’s store policy, which allows any suspicious
package to be opened and inspected, We Ship contacted the local police
department prior to opening the package.168 Four officers were present at
the store when the package was opened.169 The officers saw in plain view
several large plastic bags containing plant material in clear plastic tubes.170
While the officers were uncertain what the plant material was, they had
suspicions that the material was synthetic cannabinoid, but were uncertain
as to its legality.171 Without a warrant, the officers inventoried the contents
of the package and seized the contents of one tube for testing at the state
crime lab.172
The initial crime lab test was negative for any controlled substance, so
the officers resealed the box at We Ship and it was shipped out.173 Later,
the crime lab notified the officers that an error may have been made on the
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specimen, and the plant material may contain a controlled substance.174
The officer notified We Ship to have the package returned to the store. 175
Upon confirmation from the state crime lab that the plant material did
contain a controlled substance, the officers retrieved the package from We
Ship.176
Law enforcement contacted Defendants about the contents of the
package.177 Defendants replied they were returning product which was
initially thought to be legal in the State, but was later found to be illegal,
seeking a refund of the purchase price.178 Defendants were charged with
conspiracy to deliver controlled synthetic cannabinoids by agreeing to
arrange for the shipment of delivery of the substance to another.179
Defendants sought to suppress evidence obtained in violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights, arguing the package had been unlawfully
searched and seized without a warrant.180 The trial court disagreed, finding
the initial opening of the package a private party search, law enforcement’s
information obtained during the private party search established probable
cause, and the plain view exception allowed the warrantless seizure of the
package contents. Furthermore, the court ruled the removal of a single
specimen for analysis was not a search, and the loss of a portion of the
material was de minimis.181 Finally, the court decided the return of the
package to We Ship was justified by exigent circumstances, and there was
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the package after the contents had
previously been viewed by law enforcement.182 Defendants were found
guilty in a jury trial.183
Upon review, the court looked to the Constitution’s Fourth
Amendment184 and jurisprudence in North Dakota.185 The court found the
wrapped package, brought to We Ship, was an “effect” under the Fourth

174. Id. ¶ 7.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. ¶ 8.
178. Id.
179. Id. ¶ 9.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath of affirmation and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
185. Nickel, 2013 ND 155, ¶ 13.
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Amendment and was therefore entitled to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.186 The Defendants first argued the opening of the
package by We Ship employees in the presence of law enforcement
constituted a search by a governmental agent and not a search by a private
party.187 The court rapidly disposed of this argument, citing the lower
court’s notice of the fact that We Ship had contacted law enforcement, We
Ship had made the decision to open the package in conformity with store
policy, and no evidence was presented that law enforcement had
encouraged the opening of the package, nor had they exceeded the scope of
the private party search.188
The Defendants also argued it was error for the district court to refuse
to suppress the contents of the shipped package, as law enforcement officers
violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless search and
seizure after the private party search.189 The court responded by
analogizing to a similar case,190 also involving the opening of a suspicious
package at We Ship under store policy.191 Then, the officer transported the
package to the law enforcement center to conduct a dog sniff.192 When the
dog alerted, the officer inventoried the package and proceeded to conduct a
warrantless search of the sender’s garbage at his residence.193 The court in
that case found the removal of the package from We Ship to the law
enforcement center was more than a detention, it was seizure.194 The court
then ruled that all evidence that flowed from the unreasonable seizure must
be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.195
Here, the trial court found the seizure of the plant material from
Nickel’s package was supported by probable cause, thus a warrant was not
required under the plain view exception. However, the North Dakota
Supreme Court disagreed, stating “plain view does not justify the
warrantless seizure of the package for testing of the contents . . . and the
warrantless seizure of the rest of the contents of the package for transport to
the . . . law enforcement center.”196 Citing to United States Supreme Court
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188.
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precedent,197 the court noted that not only must the object be in plain view,
its incriminating character must be immediately apparent.198 In Nickels, the
officer admitted that he was unable to ascertain whether the plant material
was an illegal or legal substance.199 Thus, the State did not establish the
immediate incriminating evidence of the plant material.200 Nor did the
State establish that exigent circumstances existed at We Ship that would
justify a warrantless seizure at the time Nickel’s package was re-opened.201
Finally, the inventory of the package at We Ship in the absence of a
warrant, was not shown to have been done to protect or safeguard any
owner’s interest.202
The court concluded the package was properly opened in a private
party search, and as a result the officers legitimately viewed the contents of
the package.203 However, the subsequent seizure of a specimen from the
package contents and removal of the specimen to the law enforcement
center and ultimately, the state crime lab, contravened the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.204 No recognized exception to the warrant requirement
was found on the record.205 Thus, the district court was found to have erred
in denying the suppression motions which would have prohibited any
evidence stemming from the warrantless seizure of Nickel’s package to be
admitted at trial.206 The court reversed the criminal judgments.207
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Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990).
Nickel, 2013 ND 155, ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 35.

2013]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

543

GUARDIAN AND WARD – APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN
In re Guardianship of J.S.L.F.
In re Guardianship of J.S.L.F.,208 considered the granting to temporary
guardians of permanent guardianship supported, in part, by a minor
guardianship provision within the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”). The
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district court’s
grant of guardianship.
The Court held that the “suspended by
circumstances” provision in the UPC must contemplate some set of
circumstances that deprives a parent the opportunity to accept parenthood
rights and responsibilities, the provision is inappropriate in its use to
evaluate the fitness of a parent, and the record did not support a finding of
paternal abandonment.209
Shortly after the birth of J.S.L.F. in 2008, the child’s parents, B.F. and
S.M.L., came under investigation by Grand Forks County Social
Services.210 County social workers determined services were required on at
least two occasions as a result of child neglect and psychological
maltreatment.211 In October of 2008, the couple and child moved to
Glenburn, North Dakota and were investigated on at least three additional
reports of improper supervision of the child, substandard living conditions,
and malnutrition.212 In March of 2009, the couple separated and the father
returned to Grand Forks leaving the mother and child alone.213 Between
March of 2009 and December of 2010, the father saw the child
approximately six times but maintained timely child support payments.214
Following the father’s departure, S.M.L. enrolled with Job Corps to
learn better professional and parenting skills, but the reports to child
services persisted.215 In November of 2010, the mother left the child in the
custody of three co-petitioners, G.S., G.J., and K.C., and signed a copetition for guardianship consenting to their appointments as guardians.216
Two days after signing the consent form however, the mother returned to
G.S. and G.J.’s home with police to take back custody of the child.217 A
day later, the district court entered an ex parte order granting temporary
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
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guardianship of the child to G.S., G.J., and K.C., citing the mother’s
inability to provide care and finding her parental rights had been
“suspended by the circumstances.”218 No notice was ever given to the
father and no hearing was held on the temporary appointment of
guardianship.219 In late December of 2010, co-petitioners filed a notice of
petition on both parents for permanent guardianship.220 At the hearing on
petition for permanent guardianship, the district court ordered both parents’
rights were suspended by the circumstances under the relevant portion of
the UPC and granted permanent guardianship to co-petitioners.221
B.F. argued on appeal that his parental rights were not suspended by
the circumstances pursuant to section 30.1-27-04. In pertinent part, the
statute provides “[t]he court may appoint a guardian for an unmarried minor
if all parental rights of custody have been terminated or suspended by
circumstances or prior court order.” However, the court may not appoint a
guardian when a living parent of the minor is entitled to custody.222 Copetitioners argued parental rights to a child are suspended by circumstances
if the parents are found by a court to be unfit and therefore the guardianship
appointment by the district court was proper.223
The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, noting parental rights may
be suspended by circumstances when exceptional circumstances are present
which may then permit a court to utilize the best interests of the child
test.224 The court explained the phrase “suspended by circumstances” is not
defined under state statute, but found the definition used by the Idaho
Supreme Court and other jurisdictions to be persuasive: “[s]uspended by
circumstances must contemplate some set of circumstances which deprives
a parent of the ability to accept the rights and responsibilities of
parenthood.”225 A guardianship proceeding, however, is not an appropriate
forum to test the fitness of a parent, even if it may be appropriate if a parent
has formerly been adjudicated as unfit.226 The guardianship provisions
within the UPC used in the present case to suspend the parental rights of the
father were not intended by the legislature, in the court’s view, to usurp

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. ¶ 5.
221. Id.
222. Id. ¶ 7 (citing UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL VOL. 2, 511 (Richard
Wellman, ed., 2nd ed., 1977).
223. Id. ¶ 9.
224. Id. ¶ 9.
225. Id. ¶ 9 (quoting Guardianship of Copenhaver, 865 P.2d 979, 984 (Idaho 1993)).
226. Id. ¶ 9.
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existing custody jurisprudence since the Uniform Juvenile Act (“UJA”)
roundly protects the interests of children and parents.227
The court also found the guardianship lacking in several other areas,
principally in its failure to adhere to well-settled procedural guidelines
under the UJA.228 For one, the district court failed to find by clear and
convincing evidence under section 27-20-29 that deprivation or unfitness
was present in J.S.L.F.’s case. Moreover, the district failed to pursue or
discuss other available procedural options for resolving the facts.229
The district court’s finding of abandonment by suspension of the
circumstances was also found by the court to be deficient by not “stating a
legal standard for abandonment.”230 The court cited its criteria for an
appropriate finding of abandonment considering factors such as a parent’s
contact and communication with the child, love, care, affection, and
parental intent.231 For a petitioner to create guardianship on the basis of
abandonment, the party must demonstrate the exact circumstances
justifying abandonment under the UJCA or the Revised Uniform Adoption
Act (“RUAA”).232 Based on the father’s frequent contact, regular
visitation, timely child support payments, and recent co-habitation with the
child and mother, a finding of abandonment was not appropriately
supported by facts and was clearly erroneous.233 Accordingly, the
guardianship appointments were reversed and the case was remanded for
entry of judgment in the father’s favor and grant of paternal custody.234

227. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Hearing on H.B. 1040 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 43rd Legis.
Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.D. 1973) (Report of the Legislative Council for consideration by the
Comm. on Model Laws and Intergovernmental Cooperation.)).
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INSURANCE – AUTOMOBILE – STACKING
Tweten v. Country Preferred Ins. Co.
In response to a certified question by the United States District Court of
the District of North Dakota, Tweten v. Country Preferred Ins. Co.,235
answered as a matter of first impression whether limitations on North
Dakota anti-stacking statutory provisions precluded divorced, surviving
parents of a minor from recovering under multiple underinsured motorist
policies. The North Dakota Supreme Court answered “Yes” to the certified
question. The Court held the term “insured” was exclusively applicable to
the deceased minor and state anti-stacking provisions prevented stacking
and recovery under multiple, separately-held insurance policies owned by
the child’s parents.236
Following their separation and divorce in 2004, Michelle and Tony
Tweten, maintained separate households and, at the time of their child’s
death, owned separate underinsured motorist policies.237 Tony Tweten’s
coverage was under a policy with American National Property and Casualty
Company (“ANPAC”) for $250,000 and Michelle Tweten was insured with
COUNTRY insurance for the same amount.238 The Twetens’ son, T.T.,
died in a single motor vehicle accident in 2010 while riding as the
passenger in a vehicle driven by E.N.239 E.N. owned liability insurance
with Horace Mann Insurance Company with limits set at $100,000 per
person, but E.N.’s vehicle was otherwise underinsured.240
In the wake of the accident, the Twetens collectively settled a claim
against E.N.’s insurer for the policy limit of $100,000 and notified
COUNTRY and ANPAC of the settlement amount.241 Both COUNTRY
and ANPAC were provided notice by the Twetens and an opportunity to
substitute these amounts to preserve potential future claims against E.N.242
Both companies refused.243 The Twetens subsequently filed an action in
federal district court against COUNTRY and ANPAC “to recover
underinsured motorist benefits and claimed each insurer owed its per person
limit of $250,000.”244
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Finding a lack of controlling case law, the United States District Court
of the District of North Dakota issued a certified question to the North
Dakota Supreme Court for interpretation on statutory stacking prohibitions
and its effects on “identical insurance claims of divorced persons, on
separate policies, for the death of their minor son.”245 The question sought
resolution on two issues: (1) whether the Twetens were precluded from full
recovery from both policies based on anti-stacking provisions of section
26.1-40 of the North Dakota Century Code; and (2) whether the Twetens
were foreclosed from full recovery from both policies by the phrase “other
insurance” referenced in both policies.246
Seeking a “Yes” to the certified question, insurers COUNTRY and
ANPAC maintained the term “insured” applied exclusively to the injured
party, T.T. In opposition and seeking a “No” to the certified question, the
Twetens maintained the term “insured” did not exclusively apply to T.T.,
and even if it did, each insurer’s policy provided greater coverage for
underinsured motorists than the minimum required under North Dakota law
and entitled each parent to additional recovery.247 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held, “Yes,” any recovery of underinsured motorist benefits
arising out of a wrongful death claim turned on the decedent’s status as an
“insured” under the policy, not the surviving claimants. The court
disagreed with the Twetens’ principal contention, because neither Michelle
nor Tony were entitled to recovery of underinsured motorist coverage under
the other parent’s policy, the stacking did not violate statutory provisions.248
In response, the court cited its reasoning in Bjornson v. Guaranty Nat. Ins.
Co.,249 where the daughter of a deceased motorist was entitled to recovery
via underinsured motorist coverage even though the decedent’s policy
precluded recovery of uninsured motorist benefits. In Bjornnson, the
“insured” was the decedent as the holder of the policy, not the surviving
daughter seeking recovery.250 The daughter’s recovery for underinsured
motorist benefits in the wrongful death claim turned on the decedent’s
status as an “insured” entity under the policy.251 Moreover, she was
precluded from recovery of uninsured motorist benefits but was entitled to
underinsured motorist coverage.252
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For the Twetens’ claim, the court noted the provision in question
requires an insurer to provide underinsured coverage for motorists “at limits
to equal the limits of uninsured motorist coverage.”253 Under the statute,
the underinsured motorist coverage is required to pay compensatory
damages that the “insured” is entitled to collect.254 The Twetens’ recovery
of the underinsured benefits was permitted because T.T. qualified as the
“insured” under the policy. T.T., and not the Twetens by virtue of holding
separate policies, represented the “insured” party and T.T., as the “insured,”
was entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under section 26.1-4015.3(1) but precluded under from stacking policies to determine coverage
amounts under section 26.1-40-15.4(2).255 The court refused to address the
second issue regarding “other insurance” clauses in the Twetens’ policies
because their recovery was expressly barred by section 26.1-40-15.4(2).256
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INSURANCE – CONTRACTS AND POLICIES – RULES OF
CONSTRUCTION
K & L Homes, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co.
In K & L Homes Inc., v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co.,257 the issue
was whether an “occurrence” as referenced in a commercial general liability
(“CGL”) policy could have taken place such that summary judgment by the
district court was premature. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded
the facts of the case could support finding an “occurrence.” The Court
reversed the district court’s order for summary judgment and remanded.258
The dispute arose out of an underlying adverse judgment K & L
received in Leno v. K & L Homes Inc.259 Homeowners, the Lenos,
purchased a brand-new home from K & L and later discovered cracks,
unevenness, and shifting in the home’s foundation.260 Lenos sought
recovery for damages on the basis of breach of contract and breach of
implied warranty claims.261 A jury found in favor of the Lenos for
$254,629.25 and, on appeal, the court affirmed this award.262 Improper
footings and substantial shifting resulting from improperly compacted soil
formed the basis for the Lenos’ claim in the underlying action.263 During
construction of the home, not commissioned by the Lenos at the time, K &
L subcontracted with Dakota Ready Mix to perform the home’s foundation
work.264 At the time of construction, K & L was insured by American
Family Insurance under a CGL policy; but after the Lenos’s award,
American Family denied K & L’s claim for damages under the CGL
policy.265
At the district court, K & L moved for summary judgment on its claims
against American Family for declaratory judgment and breach of
contract.266 American Family cross-motioned for summary judgment.267
The district court concluded that since K & L’s work product was the entire
house, the damage caused by the subcontracted work was outside the scope
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of the CGL policy.268 Summary judgment was found in favor of American
Family.269
The CGL policy in the agreement obligated American Family to “pay
those sums that the insured [K & L] becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of . . . ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.”
270 Property damage was a term defined within the policy and required an
“occurrence” to take place within the “coverage territory” in order to be
coverable.271 Under the policy, the term “occurrence” was defined as “an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the
same general harmful conditions.”272 The CGL policy also contained
several exclusions to coverage including a “your work” exclusion with a
“subcontractor exception.”273
K & L argued the property damage from the subcontractor’s poor
workmanship constituted an “occurrence” under the policy even though the
house was considered K & L’s work and was therefore within the scope of
the policy.274 K & L further submitted the policy as a whole should be
given its full effect and the “subcontractor exception” and the “your work”
exclusion should apply.275 American Family argued the decision ACUITY
v. Burd & Smith Constr.,276 was controlling, but the court disagreed.277
Similar to a number of other courts, Burd & Smith held a CGL policy,
standing alone, does not constitute an accidental occurrence unless the
workmanship caused bodily harm or property damage to something other
than the insured general contractor’s work product.278 Taking up the issue
as to whether faulty workmanship constitutes an occurrence for K & L’s
claim, the court corrected its rationale from Burd & Smith, noting the
distinction between faulty workmanship where an insured’s work product is
damaged and faulty workmanship where a third party’s work or property is
damaged.279 Nothing in the CGL policy defined an occurrence by
distinguishing insured work product from third party property damages.280
Accordingly, the Burd & Smith rationale was overruled such that faulty
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workmanship may rise to an “occurrence in the event “the faulty work was
‘unexpected’ and not intended by the insured, and the property damage was
not anticipated or intentional so that neither the cause nor the harm was
anticipated, intended or expected.”281
But for the purpose of K & L’s CGL policy, only the occurrences that
result in “property damage” is covered.282 The court concluded the CGL
exclusion for damage under the “your work” exclusion would eliminate
coverage but for the subcontractor exception.283 As a result, an insured
general contractor’s liability for damage resulting from work by a
subcontractor is preserved by the “your work” exclusion.284 Justice
Maring’s majority opinion with a concurrence by Justice Kapsner
concluded an “occurrence” may be present with the CGL policy and
remanded for additional fact finding on unexpected or unintended nature of
the resultant damage and if other exclusions are applicable.285
Justice Crothers concurred with the majority opinion’s result but
resisted the majority’s overruling of Burd & Smith since the present case
concerned defective subcontractor work and Burd & Smith involved insured
general contractor workmanship.286 He resisted the majority’s broad
holding that faulty workmanship can be deemed an accidental occurrence
under a CGL policy and wished to wait to take up a similar contractor party
issue in advance of overruling Burd & Smith.287 Chief Justice VandeWalle
separately dissented, noting the majority’s departure from precedent was
not needed or prudent simply to match popular academic opinion.288 His
main contention was the court could reasonably source from its past
decisions to hold property damage resulting from poor craftsmanship
should constitute an occurrence to the extent property is damaged.289
Justice Sandstrom dissented, reasoning Dakota Ready Mix was not a
subcontractor, and thus, the CGL exclusion and exception at issue would
not be applicable.290 He argued there was potentially no “occurrence”
under the policy since Dakota Ready Mix was not a subcontractor to an
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existing contract at the time the foundation work was performed.291 Given
that K & L had no contractual obligation to the home buyer during the
construction of the house, Dakota Ready Mix was not acting as a
subcontractor since no contract was yet in existence.292

291. Id.
292. Id.
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MINES AND MINERALS – ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCEDURE – APPEAL AND ERROR
Gadeco, LLC v. Industrial Com’n of State of North Dakota
In Gadeco, LLC v. Industrial Com’n of State of North Dakota,293 the
owners of oil and gas leasehold interests in Mountrail County real property,
Gadeco, LLC (“Gadeco”) were invited by shared owners in the same
interest, Slawson Exploration Company’s (“Slawson”), to participate in the
cost of drilling and completing a new well. In the case’s first review in
2012, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed a district court order
overturning the Industrial Commission’s original assessment of a 200
percent risk penalty against Gadeco in Gadeco LLC v. Industrial Comm’n294
for failing to accept Slawson’s invitation to participate in the well and
remanded to the Industrial Commission (“Commission”) for additional
explanation.295 The Commission determined Slawson’s invitation to
participate to Gadeco was made in accordance with regulatory requirements
and again authorized a 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco.296 Gadeco
appealed the Commission’s second order on remand and the court
affirmed.297
The parties’ dispute dates back to July 8, 2009, when Slawson sent an
invitation letter to Gadeco and other working interest owners in the
Mountrail County spacing unit well called, Coyote 1-32H, to test drill.298
Gadeco and other leaseholders were invited to elect to participate or risk
imposition of a risk penalty and given a 30-day response window.299 On
July 15, 2009, Slawson sent a second letter informing Gadeco the drill
location and the spud date had changed from August 25, 2009 to September
27, 2009.300 Gadeco signed the election to participate invitation and
returned a check totaling $338,421.87 for its share of expenses.301 Slawson
acknowledged receipt of the check and election notice on August 20, 2009
but returned the check noting the 30-day election period had expired on
August 10, 2009.302
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2013 ND 72, 830 N.W.2d 535 (hereinafter “Gadeco II”).
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In November of 2009, Slawson petitioned the Commission for an order
to pool all interests in the well’s spacing unit and permit recovery of a 200percent risk penalty against Gadeco and other non-participators.303 Against
Gadeco’s objection, the Commission authorized the pooling and the risk
penalty based on Slawson’s compliance with section 43-02-03-16.3 of the
North Dakota Administrative Code (“NDAC”) and Gadeco’s failure to
timely respond to Slawson’s original letter.304 On the Commission’s
original decision, the district court reversed, holding the changed facts
required Slawson to provide Gadeco with a new participation invitation.305
The Court reversed the district court reversal and remanded to the
Commission for further findings of how the risk penalty was assessed and
what standard was used in its determination that the changes from the
original letter were not material or substantial.306 In short, the
Commission’s failure to make sufficient findings and provide sufficient
explanation provided the district court and the Court with an inadequate
order to review.307
On remand from the original appeal, the Commission ruled as it had
previously: the 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco was assessed and
The Commission’s
the invitation to participate was compliant.308
explanation of its standard and findings were sufficient for a district court to
affirm the Commission’s order noting the “findings and conclusions are
sustained by the law and by substantial and credible evidence.”309 On
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court applied the “substantial evidence
test” defined as “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion,” also affording deference to the
Commission’s findings.310
Gadeco made several arguments on appeal. First, the invitation to
participate did not comport with the requirements under section 43-02-0316.3 of the NDAC because the provision requires the well’s location to be
stated validly within the invitation.311 Second, Gadeco argued the second
invitation letter eliminated important terms regarding cost and spud date

303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. ¶ 3.
306. Id. ¶ 4 (citing Gadeco I, 2012 ND 33, ¶¶ 19-21).
307. Id.
308. Id. ¶ 5.
309. Id. ¶ 6.
310. Id. ¶ 7 (citing Gadeco I, 2012 ND 33, ¶ 15 (quoting Hanson v. Indus. Comm'n, 466
N.W.2d 587, 590 (N.D. 1991))).
311. Id. ¶ 8.
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sufficient to make the invitation non-compliant.312 In response, Slawson
and the Commission argued the “location” of the horizontal well did not
pertain to the surface, but to the depth and location of production.313
Moreover, the two parties maintained the terms in the letter were flexible
and, as a result, Gadeco was not entitled to more time to respond based on
the clear 30-day response requirement under section 43-02-03-16.3(1)(b).314
The principal issue turned on the interpretation of section 43-02-0316.3 of the NDAC regarding invitation to participate requirements.315
Justice Crothers’ majority opinion noted during the course of the current
and prior appeals, the parties continued dispute over this section of the code
confined the court’s holding to this singular issue.316 Accordingly, the court
focused on the requirements under this section of the code.317 Noting the
pertinent part of the code permitted flexibility in “estimated” costs and
“approximate” spud date, additional obligatory portions were present: “the
language relevant to the location of the well states the invitation must
contain ‘[t]he location of the proposed or existing well and its proposed
depth and objective zone.’“318 In the order, the Commission held the well
location to be the “completion location and not the surface location.”319
The plain language of the code required that a valid invitation need provide
both the location of the proposed well and the proposed depth and zone.320
Following the literal meaning, the court found the Commission’s analysis
ignored the word “and” but concluded it was within the Commission’s
discretion to discern whether the invitation complied with the statutory
requirements.321
The original invitation by Slawson included a description of the surface
location, vertical depth, and termination point sufficiently giving rise to
Slawson’s compliance with the invitation to participate requirements.322
Moreover, the “letter did not substantially alter the requirements for a valid
invitation for the well” and the changes were marginal. 323 Based on a
review of the evidence from the Commission’s decision, the court
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concluded the change in cost and approximate spud date were insubstantial
and the Commission’s findings that the actual well did not materially
change from the original proposed well were proper and supported by
credible evidence.324
The term “must” from section 43-02-0316.3(1)(b) governing the response window was mandatory and Gadeco’s
failure to respond within that window subjected them to an adverse ruling
and a risk penalty.325 Accordingly, the Commission’s decision was given
deference and the district court’s judgment was affirmed.326

324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. ¶ 21.
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TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – PREMISES LIABILITY – INNKEEPERS
Wotzka v. Minndakota Ltd. P’ship
In Wotzka v. MinnDakota,327 the North Dakota Supreme Court
reiterated the state standard on premises liability includes a reasonableness
standard, in which a landowner must not only anticipate the potential harm
of an open and obvious danger to an invitee, but must also act reasonably
under the circumstances.328 Wotzka sued Minndakota as the result of a slip
and fall accident in a shower at defendant’s hotel, claiming the hotel
maintained a dangerous condition on its premises by failing to equip shower
facilities with non-skid strips, bathmats or handrails.329 The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the hotel and dismissed the case,
concluding the hotel had no duty to warn or take precautions against the
open and obvious dangers of a shower, but if a duty did exist, there was no
evidence of breach of that duty.330 The court agreed summary judgment
was inappropriate for determining whether a landowner both anticipated the
harm to landowners and maintained its premises in a reasonably safe
manner.331
Plaintiff’s appeal was based in premises law, stating whether the hotel
maintained its property in a reasonably safe manner is a question of fact
inappropriate for summary judgment.332 Plaintiff stipulated that a shower
presents an open and obvious danger, but argued the hotel failed to
anticipate the harm in the shower and to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe manner by installing a handrail, non-skid strips, or
providing a bathmat.333 The court opened its analysis by observing
“negligence actions are ordinarily inappropriate for summary judgment
because they involve issues of fact.”334 An action in negligence is based on
a showing of duty, breach of duty and resulting injury proximately caused
by the breach.335 The question of whether a duty exists is generally a
question of law.336 However, when determining the existence of a duty
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depends on resolving factual issues, the question must be resolved by the
trier of fact.337
The court then defined the contours of premises liability law in North
Dakota, citing landowners owe a general duty to entrants and must use
ordinary care to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition.338
Hotels, among other establishments, must “be operated with strict regard
for the health, safety, and comfort of its patrons.”339 However, when a
dangerous condition exists on the property, which is open and obvious, the
owner may be relieved of liability.340 This relief from liability exists only
so long as the owner takes reasonable measures to prevent injury to those
whose presence can be foreseen.341
While the issue of whether hotels owe a duty, despite the open and
obvious dangers of showering, has not been addressed in North Dakota, the
court acknowledged there is a split among jurisdictions as to whether a
hotel can be found liable in failing to provide safety equipment and features
in shower facilities.342 Furthermore, the court stated the open and obvious
condition does not end the inquiry into duty, noting the owner must
anticipate the physical harm when such conditions exist.343 When the risk
of harm exists, the owner may also have a duty to warn the invitee or take
reasonable steps to protect him from such harm.344
Relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts345 and state precedent,346 the
court observed the circumstances surrounding the dangerous condition
should also be taken into consideration.347 The landowner may be required
to anticipate the invitee will encounter the dangerous condition.348 If so, the
landowner must then determine if the invitee could be distracted, fail to
protect himself, or proceed to encounter the danger because the advantages
of doing so outweigh the apparent risk.349 In these cases, the obviousness
of the danger alone does not determine if the landowner has acted
reasonably under his duty.350 Thus, the court states, even if the shower
337.
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presents an open and obvious danger, the question for the trier of fact still
remains: whether the landowner should have anticipated the harm, and, if
so, the landowner acted reasonably to keep the premises safe under the
particular circumstances.351
The court compared the shower to natural accumulations of snow and
ice, noting many jurisdictions relieve landowners from liability because of
the open and obvious nature of the danger.352 North Dakota has declined to
follow those jurisdictions and adheres to the reasonableness standard.353
The court further noted it agreed with Montana, where a finding of
negligence based on failure to provide safety enhancements in a hotel
shower is a question of fact.354 While the court affirmed the trial court’s
determination that the hotel had no duty to warn of the obvious danger of
the shower, the court reversed the summary judgment as to whether the
hotel anticipated the harm and failed to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe manner.355
Justice Crothers, joined by Justice Sandstrom, dissented from the
majority opinion, advocating instead that North Dakota should join
jurisdictions which find no duty to provide safety equipment in the face of
the known dangers from a wet and soapy shower.356 The dissent observed
the majority of jurisdictions do not impose such liability.357 Rather, most
require a showing of a dangerous condition, such as a defect in the in the
floor, beyond what is the open and obvious hazards presented by a wet,
soapy shower. Relying on a treatise, the dissent noted, “[a] crucial factor in
establishing liability for a slip and fall injury is showing that the defendant
had notice of the hazardous condition. Without such notice no liability will
attach.”358 Thus, the court has previously held “the mere fact an injury has
occurred is not evidence of negligence on the part of anyone; rather,
negligence must be affirmatively established.”359

351. Id. ¶ 13.
352. Id. ¶ 14-15.
353. Id. In Makeeff v. City of Bismarck, 2005 ND 60, 693 N.W.2d 639, the Court held the
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reasonableness standard to determine if it had breached its duty. Id.
354. Id. ¶ 17.
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358. Id. (quoting NORMAN J. LANDAU & EDWARD C. MARTIN, PREMISES LIABILITY LAW
AND PRACTICE § 8.03 2010).
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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION – CAUSE OF
UNEMPLOYMENT – LABOR OR TRADE DISPUTES
Olson v. Job Service
In Olson v. Job Service,360 a majority of the court reversed the
judgment of the district court affirming Job Service of North Dakota’s (“Job
Service”) denial of unemployment benefits to locked out claimants and
remanded for administrative resolution consistent with the court’s
opinion361 Justice Kapsner authored the majority opinion with Justice
Maring and Justice Crothers separately concurring362 Chief Justice
VandeWalle and Justice Sandstrom submitted separate dissents.363
In the summer of 2011, bargaining unit employees of American Crystal
Sugar’s (“ACS”) North Dakota facilities, represented by a variety of local
unions (“Unions”), were involved in contract negotiations with ACS
leadership.364 The parties were unable to reach an agreement, and in
August of 2011, ACS locked out the bargaining unit employees and began
using replacement workers.365 The locked out employees (“Claimants”)
applied for unemployment compensation with Job Service, but were found
to be unqualified by virtue of their unemployment stemming from the labor
dispute. In its ruling, Job Service relied on the language of section 52-0602(4) which precludes recovery of unemployment benefits if “the
individual’s employment is due to a strike, sympathy strike, or a claimant’s
work stoppage dispute of any kind which exists because of a labor dispute
at the factory, establishment, or other premises.”366
Claimants appealed as a consolidated party and an administrative
referee affirmed Job Service’s denial of the claims.367 The referee
concluded the inclusion of the phrase “any kind” under section 52-06-02(4)
was an attempt by the Legislature to be broad and could reasonably be
construed to include lockouts even if an individual was willing to work.368
Claimants sought review of the administrative decision in district court
where the court affirmed Job Service’s decision, concluding the statute
unambiguously demonstrated the Claimants were not eligible for
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unemployment compensation due to the lockout.369 Claimants maintained
the statute did not apply to locked out employees because the phrasing
“strike, sympathy strike, or a claimant’s work stoppage dispute of any kind”
only applied to work stoppages arising from employee conduct, not action
initiated by an employer.370 The inclusion of the phrase, “any kind,”
Claimants added, referred merely to other types of employee-initiated work
stoppages. ACS and Job Service argued the phrasing was intended to be
broad, plain in meaning, and included lockouts of any kind regardless of the
party responsible for causing the stoppage.371
Beginning with an analysis of the principle ejusdem generis, the
majority cited a similar statutory interpretation analysis from Resolution
Trust v. Dickinson Econo-Storage372 where the phrase “any tax on any real
estate is paid by or collected from any occupant or tenant or any other
person . . . such occupant, tenant, or other person may recover by action the
amount . . . paid.”373 In Resolution Trust, appellee argued the phrase “any
other person” broadly opened the door to any individual paying taxes in
order to qualify for a money judgment against the property owner or liable
party. The court rejected such a loose interpretation in that case and instead
relied on the inclusion of similarly classed terms to derive legislative
intent.374 In short, “the word ‘other’ would generally be read as ‘other such
like,’ so that persons or things may be read as ejusdem generis with, and not
quality superior to or different from, those specifically enumerated.”375
Using the same logic for Claimant’s appeal, “strike, sympathy strike, or
claimant’s work stoppage dispute of any kind” was found to pertain
exclusively to employee work stoppages since strikes, sympathy strikes,
and claimant work stoppages all arise out of employee-initiated action,
whereas a lockout stems from employer-initiated action. The phrasing “of
any kind” used by the Legislature was part of the other enumerated
employee actions.376 If expanded to other forms of stoppages, the court
reasoned, it would follow that employee stoppages, not employer
stoppages, was the reasonable inference.377
Therefore, the phrase
“claimant’s work stoppage dispute of any kind” applied only to employee369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. 474 N.W.2d 50 (1991).
373. Olson, 2013 ND 24, ¶ 8 (citing Resolution Trust v. Dickinson Econo-Storage, 474
N.W.2d 50 (1991) (emphasis included)).
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initiated actions and since the lockout was not employee initiated, the plain
language of the statute would not prevent Claimants from receiving
benefits.378
The court then examined the competing arguments on rational statutory
interpretations by reviewing the relevant legislative history.379 In 1981, the
legislative assembly changed the statutory language to “claimant’s work
stoppages” to differentiate employee initiated actions from employer
initiated ones.380 A review of the legislative history and cases circa 1981
demonstrated the Legislature amended “work stoppage” to include the word
“claimant’s” in order to reflect employee ineligibility when the employee,
not the employer, caused the stoppage.381 In the end, the majority reversed
the district court’s judgment affirming the Job Service denial of benefits
and remanded to Job Service for resolution in accordance with the
majority’s opinion.382
Justice Crothers agreed with the majority but added the plain meaning
of the statute and any analysis should be limited to interpreting the statute,
not debating legislative intent from the 1980s.383 The statute would limit
recovery of benefits if there was a labor dispute and if a “claimant’s work
stoppage of any kind” arises. Since a company lockout is not a “claimant’s
work stoppage,” the second element in a disqualification of benefits is not
satisfied and therefore disqualification for benefits was improper.384
Justice Sandstrom and Chief Justice VandeWalle separately dissented
with the majority’s decision. Justice Sandstrom took issue with the
majority’s failure to consider other reasonable interpretations of the phrase
“claimant’s work stoppage.” He submitted the phrase “work stoppage
dispute” under the statute reasonably includes “strikes and lockouts,” and
took issue with the majority’s interpretation which concludes “lockouts” do
not apply because of the legislative inclusion of “a claimant’s[:]” “[t]hus
the majority’s interpretation suggests the legislature intended the phrase ‘a
claimant’s work stoppage dispute’ to mean ‘strikes and lockouts, but not
lockouts.’ This is not reasonable, and a reasonable construction is
presumed.”385
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Chief Justice VandeWalle dissented, and contended the judgment of
the district court should be affirmed as to the denial of benefits.386 He
found section 52-06-04(2) and its legislative history were ambiguous such
that deference be given to Job Service of North Dakota’s interpretation of
the statute.387 Given the ambiguity, he concluded, any resolution should be
properly left to the North Dakota State Legislature, not the court, to
resolve.388
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